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Ap-

PLIES THEORY OF STRICT TORT LIABILITY TO HOSPITALS AND BLOOD

BANKS FOR TRANSFUSION-RELATED HEPATITIs--Brody v. Overlook

Hospital, 121 N.J. Super. 299, 296 A.2d 668 (L. Div. 1972).
Following his admission to Overlook Hospital for a routine operation, Eugene Brody received a number of blood transfusions upon the
advice of his physican.1 He subsequently developed serum hepatitis
which proved to be fatal. 2 His wife, Sarah Brody, in Brody v. Overlook
Hospital,8 brought an action for damages, individually and as executrix
of his estate, against the hospital, two blood banks, two doctors and a
4
medical technician.
The complaint charged negligence on the part of each defendant
under the Wrongful Death Act, 5 and further alleged that the hospital
and blood banks breached implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness for particular purpose by supplying decedent with the hepatitisinfected blood which purportedly caused his death. 6 The theory of
strict liability in tort, upon which the case was ultimately decided, was
not alleged in the complaint, but instead appeared in the pretrial order
as stipulated by the parties.7
The court decided that the evidence presented against the two
doctors and the medical technician raised a jury question on the theory
of negligence. But, with respect to the hospital the court determined
that
[i]f the jury finds that serum hepatitis virus was in the blood
transfused into decedent under the supervision of Overlook Hospital, and that decedent died as a result of hepatitis, then strict tort
liability must be applied to Overlook Hospitals

Additionally, if the jury found that "contaminated blood [was] at any
time under the control" of either blood bank, then that bank would be
I Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 121 N.J. Super. 299, 301-02, 296 A.2d 668, 669-70 (L. Div.
1972). Brody entered Overlook Hospital to be treated for a broken hip. Plaintiff's Brief
for Motion to Amend Complaint at 2-3.
2 121 N.J. Super. at 302, 296 A.2d at 670.
8 121 N.J. Super. 299, 296 A.2d 668 (L. Div. 1972).
4 Id. at 301, 296 A.2d at 670. The blood banks named in the complaint, Essex County
and Eastern, were the suppliers of the blood used in the transfusions.
5 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:31-1 et seq. (1952).
6 121 N.J. Super. at 302, 296 A.2d at 670. Plaintiff also sought damages for decedent's
pain and suffering and loss of consortium and services.
7 Pretrial Order, Brody v. Overlook Hosp., No. L-18378-68 (N.J. Super. Ct., L. Div.,
Nov. 23, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Pretrial Order].
8 121 N.J. Super. at 302-03, 296 A.2d at 670.
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liable under the same theory of strict tort liability.9 The court concluded that public policy considerations "of the utmost importance"
dictated the imposition of strict liability upon hospitals and blood
banks. 10 The case was subsequently submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiff against both the hospital and one of
the blood banks under the strict tort liability theory."1 Defendants were
2
granted leave to appeal shortly thereafter.'
Although the plaintiff sought recovery in strict liability, actions by
hepatitis victims have traditionally been based upon negligence principles. However, these suits proved ineffectual since no foolproof
method exists for testing or treating blood to detect or eliminate the
hepatitis virus. Therefore, since fault was almost impossible to establish, plaintiffs were eventually compelled to proceed upon an implied
warranty theory when seeking recovery.
Perlmutterv. Beth David Hospital3 is the most influential case in
the area of transfusion-related hepatitis, and is exemplary of the attempted use of the implied warranty theory by hepatitis victims seeking
relief for injuries sustained. 14 Relying on the fact that she was billed
separately by the hospital for the blood used in the transfusion, the
plaintiff in Perlmutter alleged that the transfer consituted a "sale"
under the Uniform Sales Act. 15 The New York court of appeals reId. at 303, 296 A.2d at 670.
10 Id. at 306, 296 A.2d at 672.
11 Eastern Blood Bank was dismissed from the suit at the inception of the trial, when
it was found that the blood it had supplied had been administered to the decedent only
days before his death. Pretrial Order, supra note 7, at 1. Serum hepatitis has an incubation
period in the human body that varies from six weeks to six months. 7 F. SCHAFFNER,
TRAUMATIC MEDICINE AND SURGERY FOR THE ATrORNEY 272-73 (1962). Therefore, since the
blood had not been in the decedent's body long enough for the disease to have matured,
Eastern's culpability was a medical impossibility.
12 Order Granting Leave to Appeal, No. AM-151-72 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div., Jan.
4, 1973).
13 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
14 The doctrine of breach of warranty maintains that if a product is defective, the
warranty, or manufacturer's promise that his product will conform to his representations,
is broken and the manufacturer is automatically liable, whether or not he exercised due
care or was otherwise at fault. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
15 308 N.Y. at 102, 123 N.E.2d at 793. The Sales Act, Law of Sept. 1, 1911, ch. 571,
§ 96 [1911] N.Y. Laws 1305 (repealed 1964), stated in pertinent part:
(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller
the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the
buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably
fit for such purpose.
(2) Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in
9
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jected this contention, holding that the contract between the plaintiff
and the hospital was primarily one for services and that the transfusion
was incidental to the overall purpose of treating the patient and therefore not subject to any warranties.'6 The majority refused to label the
hospital an "insurer" of its patients, 17 relying in part on the fact that
there was
neither a means of detecting the presence of the jaundice-producing
agent in the donor's blood nor a practical method of treating the
blood to be used for transfusion so that the danger may be eliminated ....18

The vast majority of jurisdictions, apparently unwilling to depart
from the "sales-service" distinction, 9 have chosen to follow Perlmutter.
However, at present at least four courts, employing various theories,
goods of that description (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not),
there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable quality.
16 308 N.Y. at 104-05, 123 N.E.2d at 794. The court reasoned:
Such a contract is dearly one for services, and, just as clearly, it is not
divisible. Concepts of purchase and sale cannot separately be attached to the
healing materials--such as medicines, drugs or, indeed, blood--supplied by the
hospital for a price as part of the medical services it offers. That the property
or title to certain items of medical material may be transferred, so to speak, from
the hospital to the patient during the course of medical treatment does not serve
to make each such transaction a sale. "'Sale' and 'transfer' are not synonymous",
and not every transfer of personal property constitutes a sale .... It has long
been recognized that, when service predominates, and transfer of personal property is but an incidental feature of the transaction, the transaction is not deemed
a sale within the Sales Act.
Id. at 104, 123 N.E.2d at 794 (citation omitted).
17 Id. at 106, 123 N.E.2d at 795. The court in reaching its conclusions stated:
If, however, the court were to stamp as a sale the supplying of blood--or the
furnishing of other medical aid-it would mean that the hospital, no matter how
careful, no matter that the disease-producing potential in the blood could not
possibly be discovered, would be held responsible, virtually as an insurer, if anytng
were to happen to the patient as a result of "bad" blood.
Id. The majority was apparently not ready to impose the burden of strict liability upon
hospitals, blood banks or the medical profession. There was, however, a vigorous dissent
in Perlmutter which stated that the court should not have held as a matter of law that
no sale was involved and that the plaintiff should have been given an opportunity to
establish the allegations in the complaint. Id. at 108-12, 123 N.E.2d at 796-98 (Froessel, J.,
dissenting).
18 Id. at 106, 123 N.E.2d at 795.
19 121 N.J. Super. at 305, 296 A.2d at 671. The court cited the following cases as
having followed the Perlmutter rule: Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105
(D. Colo. 1964); White v. Sarasota County Pub. Hosp. Bd., 206 So. 2d 19 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 211 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 1968); Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1967); Lovett v. Emory Univ., Inc., 116 Ga. App. 277, 156 S.E.2d 923 (1967);
Carter v. Inter-Faith Hosp., 60 Misc. 2d 733, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Dibblee v.
Dr. W.H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085 (1961); Gile v.
Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist., 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956); Koenig v. Milwaukee
Blood Center, Inc., 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964).
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have taken exception to this rule.20 Faced with the reasoning in Perlmutter, there were at least three directions in which courts could move
to afford relief to plaintiffs: (1) they could find that there was a sale,
at least in the case of a transfer between a blood bank and a hospital;
(2) while agreeing with Perlmutter that the transfer of blood was a
service, they could still allow recovery under implied warranty, relying
on the comment to the Uniform Commercial Code which states that
the legislation is not intended to impair the development of common
law warranties in non-sales situations; or (3) they could disregard the
warranty theory altogether, find blood to be a product, and apply strict
liability in tort.
The sales-service dichotomy first began to crumble in Russell v.
Community Blood Bank, Inc.,21 which held that the commercial blood
bank which may have supplied the infected blood to a hospital could
be held liable on a theory of breach of warranty since there was "at
least arguably" a sale of goods involved. 22 The Russell court, however,
refused to treat the volunteer blood banks in the same manner, reasoning that since no profit was realized, no sale occurred within the
2
meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code. 3
New Jersey has remained in the forefront in the development of
hepatitis case law, just as it has continued to lead in the field of general
20 The jurisdictions whose courts have rejected the Perlmutter rule are Florida (as
to blood banks only), New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Illinois.
21 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), aff'd as modified, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla.
1967).
22 Id. at 752. The court in distinguishing the blood banks' transaction from that of
a hospital stated:
Regardless of the fact that a hospital supplying whole blood to a patient may be
merely performing a service incident to the over-all medical attention being
furnished, we are not willing to extend this "service" characterization to the
blood bank which originally collects and distributes the commodity. It seems to
us a distortion to take what is, at least arguably, a sale, twist it into the shape of
a service, and then employ this transformed material in erecting the framework
of a major policy decision.
Id. However, the court held that the plaintiff could recover only if, through due care,
hepatitis virus could be eliminated from the blood. Id. at 755.
On appeal, the Florida supreme court felt that consideration of the subject of hepatitis detection and elimination was "premature," and treated that part of the lower court
decision as "surplusage." 196 So. 2d at 118. Even though a breach of warranty on the part
of a blood bank was found, the "sale-service" distinction remained intact, thus leaving
a hospital or nonprofit blood bank free from attack by hepatitis victims.
23 185 So. 2d at 753. Subsequently, the Florida legislature amended the state's Uniform
Commercial Code to exclude causes of action based upon breach of warranty. FLA. STAr.
ANN. § 672.2-316(5) (Supp. 1973).
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products liability. In Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital,24 the trial court,
in granting a partial summary judgment for the defendant, found that
a "sale" under the Uniform Commercial Code did exist when blood
was transfused into a patient for consideration. The court further held,
however, that if hepatitis were contracted, liability would arise only
upon a finding of negligence on the part of a hospital or blood bank
since all implied warranties had been expressly waived by means of disclaimer. 25 Refusing to affirm the trial court's decision, the supreme
court held that the record below was far too "inadequate" for a ruling
on the "highly significant" issue of whether supplying and administering institutions might be held liable to a hepatitis victim on the basis of
implied warranty or strict liability in tort. 26 The court remanded the
case for further study and deliberation, leaving for the future any challenge to New Jersey's policy of reluctance to apply strict liability to
27
hospitals and blood banks.
24 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (L. Div. 1967), rev'd and remanded, 53 N.J. 138,
249 A.2d 65 (1969).
25 Id. at 329, 333, 232 A.2d at 888, 890. The court reasoned that because medical science
had developed no conclusive test for determining whether human blood contained hepatitis
virus, and since the blood bank had placed a label disclaiming liability upon the blood
containers, invalidating all implied warranties under the Uniform Commercial Code, an
action could only be maintained in negligence. Id. at 329, 232 A.2d at 888.
26 53 N.J. at 139-43, 249 A.2d at 66-68. The court, in emphasizing the need to obtain
more information, stated:
At the trial, a complete record should be made, including not only detailed testimony as to the nature of the defendants' operations, but also expert testimony
as to the availability of any tests to ascertain the presence of viral hepatitis in
blood . . . received from commercial blood banks and other sources, and such
other available testimony and materials as may be relevant to any of the questions presented by the parties, including such economic and other factors as may
bar on the question of whether the docrinc of implied waidiaiity or s5uict iiability should apply to deliveries and transfusions of blood.
Id. at 142-43, 249 A.2d at 67-68.
Most- decisions in- other jurisdictions- have resolved the strict liability issue either before submission of the case to the jury or in the resolution of pretrial motions against
the plaintiff. Jackson was important in setting the stage for later decisions, which also
held that there was a need for a trial on all issues, including those involving strict liability and breach of warranty. Pollock, Liability of a Blood Bank or Hospital for a Hepatitis Associated Blood Transfusion in New Jersey, 2 SETON HALL L. REV. 47, 57-58 (1970).
Notably, the New Jersey supreme court did not mention the lower court's determination
that the transfer of blood was a sale. Thus, there was the implication that the court
either approved of the decision or was not concerned with the sales-service distinction.
Note, Strict Liability for Disease Contracted from Blood Transfusions, 66 Nw. U.L. REV.
80, 85 (1971). Jackson was subsequently settled, but the court's strong showing of interest
in finding policy considerations foreshadowed the Brody decision.
27 53 N.J. at 142-43, 249 A.2d at 67-68. Questions of public policy are usually resolved
in the state legislatures. Through the lobbying efforts of physicians, hospital associations
and blood bank groups, 41 states, not including New Jersey, have now enacted statutes to
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The major obstacle to those who have attempted to obtain recovery against hospitals under the theory of breach of implied warranty, as opposed to strict liability in tort, is the postulate that the
Uniform Commercial Code only applies to transactions involving
sales. 28 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Hoffman v. Misericordia Hospital,29 observed that
[n]o consideration is given to the possibility that warranties may
be implied in non-sales transactions, thus placing an undue emphasis upon whether the elements of a technical sale are present. 80
Therefore, Hoffman held that recovery may be permissible under a
breach of warranty theory "even if it should ultimately be determined
that the transfer of blood from a hospital for transfusion into a patient
is a service." 31 As a basis for this decision, the court cited many instances where, prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code,
implied warranties were found in non-sales transactions.3 2 The court
also quoted from the official comments to the Code, 3 noting that the
limit liability for hepatitis to actions based solely on negligence. Franklin, Tort Liability
for Hepatitis:An Analysis and a Proposal, 24 STAN. L. REv. 439, 474-75 (1972).
Some states have specifically enacted statutes to relieve hospitals and blood banks
from strict liability. See, e.g., Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1151 (Supp. 1972); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 91, § 181 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972) (discussed infra note 50); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 14.528(1) (1956); MISS. CODE ANN. § 7129-71 (Cum. Supp. 1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.31
(Supp. 1972-73). Other states have achieved the same result by amending the appropriate
sections of the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.2316(5) (Supp. 1973); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 106, § 2-316 (Cum. Supp. 1972); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 47-2-316(5) (Supp. 1972).
In Baptista v. Saint Barnabas Medical Center, 109 N.J. Super. 217, 262 A.2d 902
(App. Div. 1970), the court dealt with the question of whether a plaintiff could recover
damages sustained from a transfusion of incompatible blood. The court, finding for the
defendant, decided that a hospital, in the absence of negligence, should not be held liable
as an insurer of its medical services. Id. at 224, 262 A.2d at 906. The court, in limiting
liability to negligence alone, stated:
Whatever may be the final policy decision to be reached in cases involving
blood infected with viral hepatitis, we find no justification for extending the doctrine of strict liability to a case such as this where the blood is not infected or
defective.
Id.
28 UCC §§ 2-314, 2-315 (West 1972). New Jersey adopted these sections verbatim in
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 12A:2-314 and 2-315 (1962).
29 439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970).
30 Id. at 505 n.3, 267 A.2d at 869.
31 Id. at 507, 267 A.2d at 870.
32 Id. at 506 n.9, 267 A.2d at 870.
33 UCC § 2-313 (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-313 (1962)), Comment 2 provides:
Although this section is limited in its scope and direct purpose to warranties
made by the seller to the buyer as part of a contract for sale, the warranty sections of this Article are not designed in any way to disturb those lines of case
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"enactment did not intend to impede the parallel development of war'8 4
ranties implied in law in non-sales situations.
Prior to Hoffman, the New Jersey supreme court, in Newmark v.
Gimbel's, Inc., 5 showed its dissatisfaction with the sales-service distinction, at least in a non-medical context. It held a beautician, who
applied a permanent wave solution to a customer, liable for personal
injuries under breach of warranty despite the contention that this was
a service rather than a sale. Justice Francis, speaking for a unanimous
court, stated that "[t]he no-separate-charge argument puts excessive
emphasis on form and downgrades the overall substance of the transaction." 36 He stated:
One, who in the regular course of a business sells or applies a product (in the sense of the sales-service hybrid transaction involved in
the present case) which is in such a dangerously defective condition
as to cause
physical harm to the consumer-patron, is liable for the
37
harm.
law growth which have recognized that warranties need not be confined either to
sales contracts or to the direct parties to such a contract. They may arise in other
appropriate circumstances such as in the case of bailments for hire, whether such
bailment is itself the main contract or is merely a supplying of containers under
a contract for the sale of their contents. The provisions of Section 2-318 on third
party beneficiaries expressly recognize this case law development within one particular area. Beyond that, the matter is left to the case law with the intention that
the policies of this Act may offer useful guidance in dealing with further cases as
they arise.
See also UCC § 1-103 (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:1-103 (1962)).
34 439 Pa. at 507, 267 A.2d at 870. Here, as in Jackson, the court remanded the case
for further proceedings "due to the sparsity of the record." Recognizing that the law of
products liability was in a state of flux, the court noted:
We do not decide that the extent of the warrantieq implied at rommon aw -n
non-sales situations need necessarily be the same as those given statutory sanction in sales transactions under the Uniform Commercial Code ....
Nor do we
decide that 'all types of sales transactions in all situations necessarily give rise to
warranties of the same extent, or whether any duty existed on the part of the
hospital or the physician to warn the patient of any risk that may exist in the
performance of the blood transfusion due to hepatitis virus.
Id. at 508-09, 267 A.2d at 871 (footnote omitted). Therefore, a possibility of recovery did
exist, but the court was not willing to commit itself. It did, however, express interest in
the hepatitis problem when it said:
We do, however, feel that all of these issues are pertinent to a proper disposition of the cause of action here stated, and we encourage the parties to explore
them so as to provide the lower court and/or jury with adequate information
upon which to make a decision in conformity with this opinion.
Id. at 510, 267 A.2d at 871.
35 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969). See Pollock, supra note 26, at 52-54; Note, Warranties-Applicationof Implied Warranty to a Service Transaction, 1 SE'oN HALL L. Rv.
214 (1970).
86 54 N.J. at 593, 258 A.2d at 701.
37 Id. at 595, 258 A.2d at 702.
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An earlier New Jersey case 38 had held that a dentist who injured
a patient because of a defective hypodermic needle was immune from
the imposition of strict liability because he furnished professional skills
and services rather than products. Relying on that case, the defendant
in Newmark had argued that there was
no doctrinal basis for distinguishing the services rendered by a
beauty parlor operator from those rendered by a dentist or a doctor,
and that consequently the liability of all three should be tested by
the same principles.89
The court disagreed, stating that "there is a vast difference in the relationships. '40 Furthermore, the court stated, the medical practitioner
occupies a special status, and the nature of his services, relating to the
general welfare, is "so important ... as to outweigh . . . any need for
'4
the imposition ... of strict liability in tort." '
There was no mention of whether the supplying of blood by either
a hospital or a blood bank would fall within the scope of medical
services rendered, or of an ordinary commercial sale. Therefore, despite
the immunity apparently granted to the medical profession through
the dicta in Newmark, the question of hospital and blood bank liability
remained unsettled.42
The most revolutionary concept to arise since Perlmutter in the
area of infected blood, however, was the application of strict liability
in tort. 43 In Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital," a hepatitis
case, the Illinois supreme court based its finding of liability on section
402 A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, drawing an analogy to its
earlier decision in a defective automobile case. 45 Section 402 A provides:
88 Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (Hudson County Ct. 1967),
aJJ'd sub nom., Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (App. Div. 1968),
abf'd, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969).
89 54 N.J. at 596, 258 A.2d at 702.
40 Id.

41 Id. at 597, 258 A.2d at 703.
42 Pollock, supra note 26, at 54.
43 Franklin, supra note 27, at 458. Strict liability in tort applies only if an "inherently dangerous product" is in fact "defective" or harmful to a normal individual in
the normal or expected use of such product. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A
(1965). This doctrine achieves the same result as an action for breach of warranty but it
differs in that it allows a plaintiff to maintain an action directly against a manufacturer,
even when there is no privity of contract. See Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel
Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort,
19 RUTGERas L. REV. 692, 697-98 (1965).
44 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970).
45 Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
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(1)One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user
or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1)applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
46
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
The court held that (1) blood was a "product" within the contemplation of section 402 A; 47 (2) that the blood was "sold" as required by
the section; 48 and (3) that the blood in question was "in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user. '49 The sales-service
OF ToRs
§ 402 A (1965) (emphasis added).
47 Ill. 2d at 447, 266 N.E.2d at 899. In holding that the blood was a "product,"
the court quoted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT § 402 A, comment e at 350 (1965),
which provides in essence that strict tort liability is normally limited to processed articles.
But in refusing to apply that rule, the court cited another pertinent comment to the
Restatement:
"The rule is not, however, so limited, and the supplier of poisonous mushrooms
which are neither cooked, canned, packaged, nor otherwise' treated is subject to
the liability here stated."
47 Ill.
2d at 447, 266 N.E.2d at 899 (quoting from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A,
comment e at 350). Therefore, blood was a "product" in "much the same way as other
articles wholly unchanged from their natural state which are distributed for human consumption." Id.
-4-111.
at-45-,, 2G ,.E.2
at 902. The court said that "there can be no question that defendant is engaged in the business of 'selling' whole blood . . . under our
ruling in [Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965)]." Suvada
held that strict liability will be applied for reasons of public policy, rather than on
traditional warranty theories.
49 47 I1. 2d at 456, 266 N.E.2d at 904 (quoting from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402 A). The defendant contended that the blood was not in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user" and it was impossible to detect the presence of viral
hepatitis. The court, quoting from Community Blood Bank v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115,
119-20 (Fla. 1967), stated that
"neither is there any practical way of discovering a defect in a tin of canned meat
... or in a candy bar sealed in a paper wrapper ... or in a bottled drink ...
or typhoid baccilli in clams .... These decisions stand for the proposition that
the seller of a product intended for human consumption is liable for injurious
consequences resulting from the consumption of a defective or adulterated product, even though it was at the time of the sale and consumption of such product
practically or scientifically impossible to discover the defect in or adulteration of
such product."
47 Ill.
2d at 453-54, 266 N.E.2d at 902 (citations omitted). The court further stated that
"[a]ny other ruling would be entirely inconsistent with the concept of strict tort liability."
Id. at 455, 266 N.E.2d at 903.
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
47
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distinction thus became of secondary importance in ascertaining the
applicability of strict tort liability. As long as the criteria set out in
section 402 A are met,
an entity which distributes a defective product for human consumption, whether for profit or not, should legally bear the consequences of injury caused thereby, rather than allowing such loss to
fall upon the individual consumer who is entirely without fault. 50
A review of the case law concerning liability for transfusioninduced hepatitis indicates a pattern of judicial activism in opposition
to Perlmutter. The Perlmuttercourt based its decision on a strict interpretation of the warranty theory as enmeshed in the Sales Act, and
declined to render the hospital or blood banks liable as insurers of the
patient. 51 The Perlmutter decision was extremely influential in its era,
probably because the opinion "seemed sound on the basis of past
doctrine." 52 Recent decisions, however, have begun to erode the Perl50 47 Ill. 2d at 457, 266 N.E.2d at 904. The defendant contended that blood came
within the purview of the "recognized exception to the rule of strict liability," that of an
"unavoidably unsafe" product as provided in a comment to the Restatement:

There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge,
are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These
are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very
serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself
invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified .... Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied
by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A, comment h at 353-54.
The court refused to classify transfused blood as an unavoidably unsafe product
because comment k only refers to products which are not impure, but simply dangerous.
Since blood in its unadulterated form is not impure and infected and it does not involve
a "substantial risk of injury to the user," the court held that "the allegations . . . do not
come within the exception contended for by defendant." 47 Ill. 2d at 456, 266 N.E.2d
at 904.
Shortly after this decision, and as the result of pressure exerted by an influential
medical lobby, the Illinois legislature adopted a statute protecting hospitals from strict
liability. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91, § 181 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972) states:
The availability of scientific knowledge, skills and materials for the purpose
of injecting, transfusing or transplanting human whole blood, plasma, blood
products, blood derivatives and products, corneas, bones, or organs or other human tissue is important to the health and welfare of the people of this State. The
imposition of legal liability without fault upon the persons and organizations
engaged in such scientific procedures inhibits the exercise of sound medical judgment and restricts the availability of important scientific knowledge, skills and
materials. It is therefore the public policy of this State to promote the health
and welfare of the people by limiting the legal liability arising out of such scientific procedures to instances of negligence or willful misconduct.
The limitation itself is imposed by ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91, § 182 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972).
51 308 N.Y. at 106, 123 N.E.2d at 795.
52 Franklin, supra note 27, at 457. In forming this conclusion, Franklin reasoned:
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mutter approach. 53 The Russell court, while still relying on the warranty theory, deemed the transfer of blood to be "at least arguably a
sale," thus penetrating the barrier that had shielded blood banks from
liability based upon warranty in the past. 54 The Hoffman court put an
end to the fictitious distinctions between sales and services, thus
affording hepatitis victims relief under the Uniform Commercial
Code.55 The court in Cunningham delivered the final blow by holding
that, as long as the criteria set out in section 402 A of the Restatement
were met, strict tort liability would be applied, and both a hospital
and a blood bank could be held responsible on a theory completely
independent of breach of warranty."6 But none of the cases discussed
thus far considered more than superficially the underlying policy considerations involved in transfusion-related hepatitis cases. The Brody
decision, in contrast, is important because the court neither solely relied on the semantic distinction between sales and services, nor merely
adhered to a "verbal formula" of an earlier products liability case.
Judge Steinbrugge, who wrote the Brody opinion, first considered
the question of whether blood furnished by a hospital for transfusion
purposes
is perceived to be a "product" or "goods" sold to the patient, or
whether the blood is merely part and parcel of the "services" supplied by the hospital. .. 57
In response, the court reviewed and rejected the Perlmutter rationale,
[T]he law of warranties had been applied only to man-made defects in the past;
charitable hospitals were not even fully liable for their own negligence at this
time; and even profit-making hospitals were generally liable only for negligence.
Id. at 457-58 (footnotes omitted).
53 Id. at 458. One reason given for this was the adoption of the Uniform Commercial

Code in practically every jurisdiction (all states but Louisiana). See note 33 supra and
accompanying text. Another factor considered was the decline of charitable immunity.
See generally Note, The Diminishing Doctrine of Charitable Immunity: An Analysis,
19 DRAKE L. Rv. 187 (1969).
54 See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
55 See notes 29-34 supra and accompanying text.
56 See notes 44-50 supra and accompanying text.
57 121 N.J. Super. at 303, 296 A.2d at 670. The import of this determination was
explained by the court when it stated:
If blood is considered a "product" then, under the Uniform Commercial Code,
theories of breach of the warranties of merchantability, N.J.S.A. 12A:2-314, and
of fitness for particular use, N.J.S.A. 12A:2-315, are applicable. Equally as applicable is the theory of strict tort liability, i.e., liability on the part of the supplier
whether or not the supplier was at fault, as expressed in Restatement 2d, Torts,
§ 402A ....
On the other hand, if the hospital's provision of infected blood is
considered a "service," then a negligence action alone against the hospital will be
maintainable.
Id. at 303-04, 296 A.2d at 670-71.
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stating that "much has changed since 1954 in the operation of hospitals
and the legal principles pertaining thereto."58 Agreeing with the result
59 and Hoffman, 60
in both Cunningham
the court nevertheless criticized
these decisions for not addressing "themselves to any sound policy reasons for extending the doctrine of strict liability to hepatitis cases." 61
The court felt that policy considerations were of the utmost importance and quoted Justice Traynor of the California supreme court:
"Even if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands
that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce
the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that
reach the market. It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against the recurrence of others, as
the public cannot ....,,62
In Judge Steinbrugge's estimation, then, a decision in Brody required
an exploration of policy considerations.
The court examined the possible impact of strict liability upon
blood banks and hospitals,"63 and concluded that strict liability would
have
the effect of forcing the entity that markets the product to consider
the "accident costs"

.

.. when deciding whether and from where to

procure it. In the case of blood, the "safety rationale" emphatically applies to hospitals because, as a general rule, each hospital
has a choice of several blood banks as potential suppliers. 64
Therefore, the adoption of a strict liability standard would force hospitals to purchase only from those blood banks maintaining the highest
58 121 N.J. Super. at 305, 296 A.2d at 671.
59 Id. at 305-06, 296 A.2d at 672. The court, relying on § 402 A of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRTs, held the hospital liable under strict liability for injuries suffered by
a patient who had contracted hepatitis from a transfusion. See notes 44-50 supra and
accompanying text.
60 Id. at 305, 296 A.2d at 671-72. The court held that, although a transfer of blood
from a hospital to a patient was a "service," recovery might still be permissible on a
breach of warranty theory under the Uniform Commercial Code. See notes 29-33 supra
and accompanying text.
61 Id. at 306, 296 A.2d at 672. The court stated:
Perlmutter dealt only with the semantic question of whether the transaction (the
blood transfusion) was a "sale" or a "service" ... .Hoffman recognized the problem; Cunningham dealt only with the verbal formula of § 402A.
Id.

62 Id. (quoting from Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d
436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J.,concurring)).
63 Id. at 307-08, 296 A.2d at 672-73.
64 Id.

at 307, 296 A.2d at 672 (footnote omitted). See generally AMERICAN

ASSOCIATION,

COMMITrEE ON BLOOD,

CILITIES AND SERVICES (1969).

DIRECTORY OF BLOOD BANKING AND
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level of safety, "thus decreasing the risk of a patient's becoming infected
with hepatitis as a result of a transfusion." 65 The court explained that
''even in the comparatively low number of cases" where a hospital
deals with only one blood bank, the imposition of strict liability could
consequently "spur the hospital to take a more active role in influencing the bank's collection processes, i.e., more careful screening of
66
donors."
The court believed that the most important result to be achieved
by applying the strict liability doctrine would be to force hospitals to
regulate more carefully their own use of blood, and to encourage
medical research to either advance new and adequate methods of discovering hepatitis in the blood or to develop a protective vaccine to be
67
administered to a patient about to undergo a transfusion.
The defendant Overlook Hospital argued that a hospital confronted with the threat of strict liability would only pass along its additional costs to its patients, thus defeating any safety incentive. The
court, in finding that contention unpersuasive, observed:
65 121 N.J. Super. at 307, 296 A.2d at 672. It has been suggested that hospitals could
either change from one commercial bank to another which maintained a better record, or
possibly induce volunteer blood banks to expand their activities by adding facilities or
staying open longer. The result of these proposals would be a lower cost to the hospitals
for those hepatitis cases that occurred despite these safety measures. Franklin, supra
note 27, at 470.
66 121 N.J. Super. at 307, 296 A.2d at 672. There is an inherent difficulty surrounding
the screening of blood donors. The only satisfactory method of identifying possible hepatitis carriers is through extensive questioning of donors regarding any prior medical history or past symptoms which might indicate an early stage of hepatitis. This procedure
is of doubtful value in that the potential donors may not be aware that they are carriers
of the disease. in the case of paid donors, many of whom are alcoholics or drug addicts,
there is a strong motive to lie or refuse to disclose pertinent facts relating to their medical
history. Haut & Alter, Blood Transfusions-Strict Liability;%43 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 557,
559 (1969). As to differences in the incidence of hepatitis among commercial and volunteer
blood banks, see note 74 infra.
67 121 NJ. Super. at 307-08, 296 A.2d at 672-73. Although much experimentation has
taken place over the years, no test has been developed that will satisfactorily detect a
hepatitis carrier. The most effective test advanced to date is the hepatitis-associated antigen
test, which has a detection rate of only about 20-30%. See Blumberg, Sutnick, London &
Millman, Australia Antigen and Hepatitis, 283 NEw ENG. J. MED. 349, 352 (1970); Prince &
Burke, Serum Hepatitis Antigen (SH): Rapid Detection by High Voltage Immunoelectroosmophoresis, 169 SciENCE 593 (1970).
There has been research on a vaccine to immunize potential blood donors from hepatitis. While there is optimism for its eventual success, it has not yet progressed to a point
where public use is possible. N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
It has also been suggested that if hospitals allocated their hepatitis costs as a charge
on each unit of blood used, doctors would weigh the risks of elective surgery more carefully and would also utilize component therapy as an alternative to a blood transfusion,
thus shifting toward safer substances and away from whole blood. Franklin, supra note 27,
at 471; see note 80 infra and accompanying text.
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Insurers will not write liability policies unless satisfied with the
level of care exercised by the hospital. And, even if the cost to each
patient is marginally increased, public policy dictates the imposition of strict tort liability. 68
Another policy consideration discussed by the court was the concept
of "loss spreading." Under this theory, a hospital forced to sustain
losses resulting from hepatitis-infected blood would "tend to spread
the loss among all parties, i.e., donors, blood-banks, [and] perhaps its
patients."'69
The court further considered the possible application of N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:53A-7 and -8,7o which limit the liability of charitable
corporations and nonprofit institutions respectively, 7 ' but which are
68 121 N.J. Super. at 308, 296 A.2d at 673. The defendant's argument ignores the fact
that the majority of patients obtaining transfusions will be covered by health insurance.
Therefore, even if insurance costs increase marginally, the risk will be distributed among
the largest group practicable, the policy holders. Although this theory might inflict a
harsh burden upon some-for example, those who cannot afford to procure medical insurance or those who are denied coverage (i.e., hemophiliacs)-the public policy involved
in protecting the greatest number of people possibly outweighs such factors. Note, supra
note 26, at 94 n.58. Aside from the economic aspect, another consideration that should be
noted is the hospital's concern about its reputation and good will. This further motive
should also increase the safety incentive.
69 121 N.J. Super. at 308, 296 A.2d at 673. The theory of "loss spreading" involves an
attempt to maximize the number of persons who will bear the losses or increased costs
resulting from strict liability, thus minimizing the effect upon the individual. Although
some argue that these risks can be covered by health insurance, this rationale is dubious
since the very poor would probably have no insurance. Further, medical policies generally
cover only such damages as medical expenses and lost income, providing no coverage for
pain and suffering. Therefore, strict liability offers a more trustworthy means of allocating
the losses sustained. Franklin, supra note 27, at 463-64. See generally Calabresi, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
70 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7 (Supp. 1972-73) provides in pertinent part:
No nonprofit corporation, society or association organized exclusively for religious, charitable, educational or hospital purposes shall .. .be liable to respond
in damages to any person who shall suffer damage from the negligence of any
agent or servant of such corporation, society or association, where such person is
a beneficiary, to whatever degree, of the works of such nonprofit corporation,
society or association ....
Id. (emphasis added).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-8 (Supp. 1972-73) provides in pertinent part:
[A]ny nonprofit corporation, society or association organized exclusively for hospital
purposes shall be liable to respond in damages to such beneficiary who shall suffer
damage from the negligence of such corporation, society or association or of its
agents or servants to an amount not exceeding $10,000.00, together with interest
and costs of suit, as the result of any 1 accident and to the extent to which such
damage, together with interest and costs of suit, shall exceed the sum of $10.000.00
such nonprofit corporation, society or association organized exclusively for hospital
purposes shall not be liable therefor.
Id. (emphasis added).
71 121 N.J. Super. at 308-10, 296 A.2d at 673-74. The court stated that Overlook
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specifically worded to include liability based upon negligence only. The
court held that "[t]he concept of 'negligence' is foreign to that of 'strict
liability,' and therefore the statute has no application to the situation
72
at bar."
Turning to a consideration of the blood banks' liability, the court
dealt with the question of whether the two suppliers involved fell
within the ambit of section 402 A. It concluded that blood banks do
meet the requirements of that section since
[a]ll blood banks sell their product (blood) for a price. If the sold
blood is infected with hepatitis virus, that blood is in a "defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer" (the
ultimate patient). A blood bank's actual business is to sell the product, blood. And it is mandatory that the blood reach the user (the
patient) "in the condition in which it is sold": no opening of the
container carrying the blood is permitted at any step along the line
73
of distribution.
Judge Steinbrugge stated that public policy demanded the imposition of strict tort responsibility on blood banks, "if for no other reason
Hospital would only fall within the ambit of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-8 if it were shown
to be a non-profit institution. Id. at 309, 296 A.2d at 673.
72 Id. at 310, 296 A.2d at 674. Judge Steinbrugge further stated that
the concept of negligence is not relevant to the doctrine of strict liability. One
is the antithesis of the other. Wherever the ordinary concept of negligence obtains, a showing of "due care" by the defendant rebuts the plaintiff's contentions.
But where strict liability prevails, "due care" is not relevant. Defendant's liability
is predicated upon the fact of the injury's occurrence, and not upon any lack of
care.
Id. at 309, 296 A.2d at 673.
Although the court read these statutes as referring to negligence only, tis qi-etionable whether the New Jersey legislature intended such a result. It seems more likely that
those who enacted the statutes sought to protect the nonprofit and charitable organizations
from all liability arising-without fault.- See Statement accompanying N.J.-Senate Bill 789,
introduced Mar. 20, 1972 (proposed amendment to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-316). This bill
would provide that implied warranties of merchantibility and fitness under the Uniform
Commercial Code do not apply to the sale of blood, blood plasma, human tissues or
organs. Section 5 of the bill states:
Such blood, blood plasma or tissue or organs shall not for the purposes of this
chapter be considered commodities subject to sale or barter, but shall be considered as medical services.
But realistically, what would the passage of this act accomplish? If S. 789 were enacted as presently written, only actions based on breach of warranty would be eliminated,
leaving intact strict liability actions sounding in tort. Of course, the bill could be reworded
to include strict tort liability and thus effectively avoid responsibility without fault.
It will be interesting to see the legislative reaction to Brody. Whether New Jersey's
strong medical lobby will succeed in thwarting strict liability, as happened in Illinois
following Cunningham, will be decided in the coming months. Thus, compensation for
the hepatitis victim may be determined by the legislature and not the judiciary.
73 121 N.J. Super. at 310, 296 A.2d at 674; cf. Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,
12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
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than to discourage carelessness in the selection of donors. ' 74 He reasoned that under the strict liability theory, a blood bank would assume the position of a supplier of goods, as opposed to a manufacturer,
in choosing which of several donors (the actual manufacturers) it would
purchase from. 75 Quoting from Cunningham, the judge concluded:
"If the article left the defendant's control in a dangerously unsafe
condition.., the defendant is liable whether or not he was at fault
in creating the condition or in failing to discover and eliminate
it ....

"76

The court also examined the effect that strict liability would have
upon commercial and volunteer blood banks. Where a commercial or
volunteer blood bank held a monopoly in a community, it would risk
competition if it maintained a poor safety record and was forced to
raise its rates in order to "pass along" the costs "inevitably associated
with strict liability." 77 In such a case, the competition would be from
74 121 N.J. Super. at 310, 296 A.2d at 674. For a discussion of the difficulty involved
in screening donors, see note 66 supra. It has been suggested that if higher sums of money
were offered, healthy donors would be more readily induced to give blood. Franklin,
supra note 27, at 466-67 n.167 and accompanying text. On the subject of blood bank economics, see generally R. TiTMuss, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL
POLICY (1971), reviewed by Solow, 80 YALE L.J. 1696 (1971).
Most medical authorities concede that blood obtained from a commercial blood bank
has a higher incidence of hepatitis contamination than that obtained from a volunteer
bank. Several reasons have been suggested for this disparity. One reason is that a donor
for cash has a greater incentive to misrepresent his medical history than the volunteer
donor. Also, commercial banks tend to be located in large urban areas where they attract
drug addicts, alcoholics and others in questionable physical condition. Allen, Volunteer
Blood for Everyone, 9 STAN. M.D. 2 (1970); Cohen & Dougherty, Hepatitis Arising From
Addict Blood Donors, 203 J.A.M.A. 427 (1968); Grady & Chalmers, Risk of Post-Transfusion Viral Hepatitis, 271 NEW ENG. J. MED. 337 (1964); Kunin, Serum Hepatitis from
Whole Blood: Incidence and Relation to Source of Blood, 237 AM. J. MED. Scs. 293 (1959).
Furthermore, a blood bank that sells its product at a profit has less incentive to carefully
screen donors than a nonprofit blood bank that is performing a public service. Pollock,
supra note 26, at 49.
Generally, the probability of receiving infected blood from a commercial blood bank
is five per hundred compared to a rate of five per thousand for volunteer banks. For
statistics relating to the comparative ratio between commercial and volunteer blood banks,
see Franklin, supra note 27, at 444-45 n.37.
A further problem is posed by the imposition of liability on more than one blood
bank, conceivably requiring an innocent party to pay for hepatitis caused by another's
blood, thus depriving him of due process of the law. See 14 MEDICAL WoRLD NEws 60 (1973).
Judge Steinbrugge answered these questions by noting that there was no way to decide
which pint had caused the hepatitis, and that all the pints were actually a single product.
Record at 411-13.
75 121 N.J. Super. at 310, 296 A.2d at 674.
76 Id. at 311, 296 A.2d at 674 (quoting from Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp.,
47 Ill. 2d 443, 454, 266 N.E.2d 897, 903 (1970)).
77 121 N.J. Super. at 311, 296 A.2d at 674.
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both emerging commercial banks and hospital-created banks.78 Where
blood banks are in competition, "the imposition of strict liability will
force them to 7intensify
(or in some cases commence) their efforts to find
'safe' donors." 9 Blood banks as well as hospitals would feel the impact
of such an "allocative effect" rationale:
Where a community has more than one blood bank, strict liability
will cause the blood bank with the poorer safety record to charge
higher fees. Since hospitals patronize the bank charging the lowest
fee, there will be greater demand for blood from the bank with the
better safety record. The incidence of hepatitis infection must thus
80
be reduced.
Judge Steinbrugge considered the question of whether a blood
bank or hospital might be unfairly burdened with strict liability and
explained that strict liability is based not upon fault but upon physical
control over the defective product while it is in its defective state.81 He
then traced the route that blood traveled from the donor to the patient,
noting that hepatitis virus finds its origin either in the donor's blood or,
"at the latest," by needle when the blood is extracted from the donor.
Therefore, since it reaches the operating room or bedside "in its original package," the blood in its defective state "passes through the
physical control" of both the blood bank and the hospital, thus
rendering them liable under section 402 A.82
78 Id. It has been suggested that because a blood bank is monopolistic, there is less
incentive to improve its supply of blood. Judge Steinbrugge felt that the imposition of
strict liability would provide that incentive.
79 Id. See notes 66 and 74 supra for a discussion of the difficulties involved in finding
safe donors.
80 Id. at 312. 296 A.2d at 675c Reource allocatlon is founded upon the premise that
a purchaser should not only be informed of the costs of labor and materials used in
producing a product, but that he should also be made aware of the social costs. Thus,
if two -products-appear similar in both utility and manufacturing costs, but one causes
undue injury to users, that product would be priced higher, thereby making consumers
aware of the actual social costs involved. For an argument in support of the allocative
effect, see Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocatio" and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11 J. LAw & ECON. 67 (1968). But see Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw &
ECoN. 1 (1960). The court in Brody concluded that the allocative effect would be applicable to hepatitis situations. But, in fact, the market does not necessarily control the price
of blood in all cases. Where, for instance, a number of hospitals use a single blood bank
to supply their needs, there will probably be no price differential since all hospitals are
likely to have similar hepatitis risks. Franklin, supra note 27, at 471. Another example of
this is where either the Red Cross or other volunteer blood banks operate in an area with
competing commercial banks. Arguably, since the volunteer banks supply blood of a
higher caliber (less risk of hepatitis), they could command a higher price from the hospitals. But generally, the Red Cross charges only a processing fee for its blood, and therefore
actually sells its blood at a lower price than do the commercial banks. Id. at 468-69.
81 121 N.J. Super. at 312, 296 A.2d at 675.
82 Id. at 312-13, 296 A.2d at 675 (emphasis in original).
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The court concluded by declaring:
[B]ecause transfused blood is a "product," its transferral constitutes
a "sale" or "sales." Where the blood ("product") contains serum
hepatitis virus, it is in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer" (the patient), and the doctrine of strict
tort liability applies. 83
Although strict tort liability was implemented to accord relief to
Mrs. Brody, use of the warranty sections of the Uniform Commercial
Code would have produced the same result. Perhaps the court felt that
the warranty theory would place too great a hardship upon a plaintiff
seeking relief for a hepatitis-related injury, thus contravening public
policy. This burden is exemplified by the Code provision requiring a
plaintiff to give notice to the seller of any breach of warranty "within
a reasonable time" after injury occurs, and in absence of such notice,
requiring that he be "barred from any remedy."' s However, the average patient who contracts hepatitis in a hospital probably does not
possess a sufficient knowledge of sales law to protect his interests under
the Code. Alleviating the duty of timely notice through the use of strict
tort liability thus provides a more equitable result.
An additional and far-reaching problem presented by the warranty
theory involves the use by hospitals and blood banks of disclaimers
which are printed on the blood containers and are designed to relieve
these institutions from liability. This method of limiting or decreasing
liability is valid in all actions based upon breach of implied warranty.8 5
Courts may be reluctant to enforce this defense because almost invariably the patient is unaware of the disclaimer. Often he is unconscious
and awaiting surgery when the blood arrives for the transfusion, so that
it would be unfair to charge him with knowledge of the disclaimer
and permit the blood bank or hospital to avoid liability.86
83 Id. at 313, 296 A.2d at 675. Judge Steinbrugge stated that the latest the blood
could have become infected was at the time of extraction from the donor. However, it is
possible that hepatitis may have been contracted from the needle by which the patient
received blood at the hospital. In such a case, the defective product would not have been
under the blood bank's physical control and therefore it would seem that the strict liability rationale would not be valid. Perhaps the court took this possibility into consideration and determined that the likelihood of a patient contracting hepatitis in the sanitary
surroundings of a hospital was so insignificant as to be outweighed by the public policy
considerations involved in protecting an innocent hepatitis victim.
84 UCC § 2-607 (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-607 (1962)) provides in pertinent part:
(3) Where a tender has been accepted
(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have
discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy

UCC § 2-316 (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-316 (1962)).
86 See Pollock, supra note 26, at 56-57. Cf. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc,, 32
85
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But the problems raised by the Uniform Commercial Code are
not the only questions posed by the Brody opinion. A logical progression could lead to an extension of the doctrine of strict tort liability.
For instance, now that blood is considered a product and its transfer
a sale, will the same doctrine be extended to human organs and their
transplantation? At present, since organ transplants are still a relatively
new development and the supplying of organs bears little resemblance
to the multi-million dollar interstate commerce in blood, the analogy
may be inappropriate. However, with greater technical competence
and the increased use of organ transplants, the near future may find
these transfers paralleling in importance the use of blood transfusions.
Thus, strict liability might be an appropriate basis for relief. Assuming
that the comparison between blood transfusions and organ transplants
is valid, it would seem in light of Brody that strict liability would attach in the case of a diseased organ even though there were still no
adequate tests for determining whether a disease were present in the
tissue. If such a test were available and it were not utilized, or if the
tissue were merely incompatible, public policy would not necessarily
dictate the imposition of strict liability, and a recovery could also be
87
based upon negligence.
N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (manufacturer's disclaimer of liability for new car ineffective
where terms were not made known to purchaser). See also Franklin, When Worlds Collide:
Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974 (1966);
Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 804 (1966).
Although it is doubtful that warranty disclaimers constitute a viable defense, assumption of the risk is a valid defense even to a cause of action based on strict tort liability.
RESTATEMENT (SEconD) OF ToRTs § 402 A, comment n at 356 (1965), however, requires
hidden defect rather than a general appreciation of
.tua.......
or knowledge ohe
fu
the danger involved. Given the virtual impossibility of detecting hepatitis virus in the
blood, it is doubtful whether this defense could be successfully utilized by a hospital or
blood bank. The q-u-estion-is further complicated in light of the fact that New Jersey does
not recognize the doctrine of assumption of risk as an affirmative defense, finding it indistinguishable from contributory negligence. See McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co.,
41 N.J. 272, 196 A.2d 238 (1963); Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44,
155 A.2d 90 (1959).
87 See Baptista v. Saint Barnabas Medical Center, 109 N.J. Super. 217, 262 A.2d 902
(App. Div. 1970) (where blood was not infected, but merely incompatible, recovery could
be sustained on a negligence theory only). See discussion at note 26 supra.
At present, there is a vast difference between blood transfusions and organ transplants. It has been estimated that some six million pints of blood are drawn from donors
each year, and blood is bought and sold in enormous quantities. R. Trrmuss, supra note 74,
at 47-69, 90-91. Human organs, in contrast, are not "in the stream of commerce" since
they are not bought or sold in the open market, but rather, are transmitted from a
donor directly to a recipient. However, given a situation where organs are within the
"stream of commerce," (e.g., an eye bank may buy and sell eyes), strict liability will not
necessarily be invoked. Application of Section 402 A is not mandatory. Generally courts
will apply strict liability, at least in a medical context, only if public policy so dictates.
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The impact that Brody is likely to have upon New Jersey's blood
supply may be widespread and significant. Judge Steinbrugge has suggested that blood banks will, as a result of this decision, commence
screening blood donors more carefully."' However, with the implementation of such a procedure, the possibility exists that the volume of
blood received by the banks will necessarily decline, 9 thus causing a
possible shortage of an indispensable commodity. Yet, even in the face
of such a shortage, it may be argued that the importance of compensating hepatitis victims outweighs the speculative risk of a blood defiTwo further questions involve the possible extension of strict tort liability either to
the doctors, who prescribe transfusions, or to the donors, who are the real "manufacturers"
of the "defective product." The court in Brody declined to consider the question of imposing strict liability upon a physician because the issue had not been raised by the
plaintiff's pleadings. 121 N.J. Super. at 302, 296 A.2d at 670. But in light of prior New
Jersey cases dealing with physicians' liability, it is doubtful that the court would depart
from its traditional reluctance to render the medical profession liable under any theory
except negligence. See Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (Hudson
County Ct. 1967), afy'd sub nom., Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637
(App. Div. 1968), afl'd, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969) (court refused to hold dentist
strictly liable when defective needle caused injury to patient). The court in that case
distinguished between the distribution of products and the furnishing of professional
skills and services. See also Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969)
(discussed at notes 35-42 supra and accompanying text).
The possible application of strict liability to a blood donor after contraction of hepatitis by a patient presents a different problem. Does public policy demand that an innocent donor bear the burden of strict responsibility for the blood he provides? Looking to
the policy justification delineated by Judge Steinbrugge in Brody, the answer is apparently in the negative, since there is no substantial reason for imposing such liability upon
a donor. For a discussion of policy considerations relating to the blood donor, see Franklin, supra note 27, at 465. In addition, when the normal economic status of the commercial
donor is examined, it seems probable that he will be judgment-proof, thus rendering any
benefit that might be derived from the application of strict liability ineffective. The
enigma is further amplified in the case of the volunteer donor. It is not certain whether
he falls within the ambit of section 402 A since he receives no compensation and therefore
might not be a "seller."
88 121 N.J. Super. at 307, 296 A.2d at 672.
89 Commercial donors, who are the major source of hepatitis-infected blood, account
for about 33% of all blood collected. Another high risk group are prison donors, who
account for an additional 5%, and who may give blood to make a favorable impression
upon parole boards and therefore may tend to falsify their medical histories so that their
blood will be accepted. R. TiTMuss, supra note 74, at 94.
Should these two groups, who account for 38% of all blood collected, be thoroughly
screened, a great number of donors would be found ineligible to contribute, thus greatly
reducing the nation's blood supply. Haut Sc Alter, supra note 66, at 577. It should also be
noted that the percentage of paid donors has been steadily increasing over the past few
years. Franklin, supra note 27, at 441.
Judge Steinbrugge, however, does not agree that a blood shortage will necessarily
result. He feels that the allocative effect will cause physicians to weigh the risks of surgery
more carefully and thus cause less blood to be used, therefore striking a balance and nullifying any potential blood shortage. 121 N.J. Super. at 308, 296 A.2d at 673.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

ciency. But the question still remains: where will the blood come
from?90

One tenable solution would be a large-scale continuing education
program geared to the middle and upper-income communities, 91 stressing the emergency proportions of the blood shortage along with the
self-insurance available through blood donations.9 2 Such a campaign
could be directed toward social and fraternal organizations, the military, industry, and other large segments of the population. It has also
been suggested that in order to induce healthy individuals to donate
blood, higher sums of money must be offered. 93 But this alternative
would have to be weighed against the additional insurance costs necessitated by the imposition of strict liability.
Transfusion-related hepatitis is a complex and serious medical and
legal problem. The court in Brody has determined that public policy
dictates that the interests of an injured patient outweigh those of a
hospital or blood bank, and this can be interpreted as a judicial finding
that society as a whole should bear the cost of transfusion-related hepatitis. New Jersey's hospitals and blood banks have expended virtually no
funds for hepatitis research in the past, nor is there any indication that
there will be any significant financial involvement by these institutions
in the future. 94 Perhaps, in the wake of Brody, the medical profession,
hospital groups, and blood banks, rather than opposing the imposition
of strict liability, will be forced to expend their valuable time in pursuit of a suitable medical solution to this pressing problem.
Martin R. Raskin
One author suggests a mandatory system of blood donation, possibly requiring all
physically fit residents to give blood periodically. But this solution raises substantial constitutional questions. See Note, supra note 26, at 95 n.66.
Russia, in attempting to meet its blood requirements, has turned to the use of cadaver
blood for transfusions. Medical News, 194 J.A.M.A. 30 (1965). This method, on a limited
scale, has been attempted recently in the United States for the treatment of cancer patients
and has been relatively successful. Trout, Blood Transfusions, 73 DIcK. L. REV. 201, 217
(1969).
91 See note 74 supra for a discussion of the reasons for excluding low income groups.
92 An example of the blood insurance available to the public is provided by the
Greater New York Blood Program. Membership requires blood donations rather than
money, and plans are available for both individuals and groups. In essence, what this
insurance provides is blood replacement credit for the donor and members of his family
for each year blood is given. Replacement credit is transferable to any hospital in the
United States and its possessions. This credit relieves the patient of the cost of any blood
used but does not include a processing fee. A donor who is a member of a Blue Cross or
Blue Shield plan, however, can avoid even this processing charge.
93 See generally R. TrrMuss, supra note 74.
94 Record at 293, 556-59, 604-06, 621-24 (Brody).

